I am still looking over books to use as textbooks for my Creativity and Innovation course next semester. Right now I am reading through Weisberg’s book “Creativity: Understanding Innovation in Problem Solving, Invention, and the Arts.” This book is a likely candidate for a required text for several reasons.

It does not assume any knowledge of psychology on the part of the reader.

The author takes a cognitive approach to creativity but also discusses other approaches to the study of creativity.

I agree with a lot the author has to say but also disagree with some of his beliefs and assumptions. I am hoping this disagreement will result in some good discussion fodder in the class.

One of the first topics addressed in his book is the definition of creativity.

The standard definition of creativity is that the product/process/idea needs to be both novel AND useful/appropriate. There is some debate of what it means for something to be novel. However, most concede that for something to be novel it has to be novel for either the individual generating the idea (“mundane” or “psychological” creativity) or it has to be novel with respect to all human history (“historical” creativity).

There is more debate about the second component; that the novel idea be useful or appropriate to the domain in which the creativity is occurring.

What this means is that a creative poem must be a poem. It must satisfy poetic constraints of meter, rhythm and metaphor.

A creative product must satisfy a need.

Those taking a problem solving approach to creativity might say that a creative solution to a problem must be both novel and solve the problem. “Solving the problem” is what determines whether a novel solution is useful or appropriate.

Weisberg, in defining creativity, only focuses on one definition. He focuses on Csikszentmihalyi’s definition that a creative product is both novel and has value.

How is value determined? By the gatekeepers of the discipline. A scientific theory or finding has value when it is published in a peer reviewed journal. A piece of music has value when it is performed publicly and people pay to hear the music. A painting has value when it is sold or displayed in a gallery.

At least this is Weisberg’s presentation of Csikszentmihalyi’s definition.

Weisberg has a problem with this view and I agree with him. Many novel works that were considered valuable at inception do not endure the test of time. Does that mean they were creative but became less creative with time? Other novel works were considered valueless at inception but became highly valued over time. Does this mean they also became more creative over time?

I doubt it and so does Weisberg. Though value is an important component of creativity, it shouldn’t define creativity. Perhaps value is what distinguishes creativity from innovation.

As much as I have problems with this definition of creativity, I have even more difficulty with Weisberg’s definition of creativity. He says that novelty alone makes something creative as long as that novelty was intentional (it can’t have occurred by accident). It doesn’t have to solve a problem, or be appropriate to the domain or be useful. It just has to be intentionally novel.

This suggests that failed attempts to solve a problem are just as creative as the novel solution to a problem. A grocery list could be a creative poem as long as someone says it is a poem.

Where Csikszentmihalyi’s definition might be too dependent on context, Weisberg’s definition is too inclusive. I feel that, at the very least, a creative product needs to be both novel and a member of the domain in question (it has to be a poem, a theory of evolution, a painting…).

Having said that, Weisberg brings up some good points in defense of his definition. He points out that Watson and Crick generated several incorrect solutions to the problem of the structure of DNA. For example, for a while they considered a triple-helix model of DNA. Weisberg’s definition states that this incorrect solution is just as creative as the correct solution (the double helix). He argues that the same creative cognitive processes produced the double helix solution as produced the triple helix solution. The fact that one solution was correct and the other incorrect does not alter the fact that the act of generating the solutions was a creative act.

I had to concede that point (even though I didn’t want to).

So how do I reconcile this point with the intuition that Weisberg’s definition is too inclusive?

Perhaps Weisberg intends to define creativity in terms of the processes that result in the creative product. The creative processes that generate incorrect solutions and failed attempts are the same creative processes that generate successes. Hence, if a novel idea is the result of a creative process then it must be creative.

However, the cognitive approach to creativity assumes that creativity results from normal cognitive processes operating on normal knowledge structures. Sometimes the result of the processes is something ordinary. At other times, the result is novel and creative.

Weisberg subscribes to the cognitive approach. Consequently, he must not be making the claim I think he is – that it is the use of special creative cognitive processes that determine whether or not the novel product is creative.

Frankly, I’m not sure how he would reconcile this issue.

I would reconcile this issue by suggesting that part of the creative process is rejecting unfit solutions or alternatives and persisting in working towards the “appropriate” or “useful” solution to a problem. Consequently, a novel but incorrect solution is not creative. Creativity is achieved by continued work towards a goal until the product is both novel and appropriate or useful.

The degree of creativity of the product is related to the degree to which the creator tweaks the creation until it satisfies both criteria of creativity: novelty and usefulness.